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We show that measurement error in the constructed price of child care can explain
why previous Australian studies have found partnered women’s labour supply to
be unresponsive to child care prices. Through improved data and improved con-
struction of the child care price variable, we ﬁnd child care price elasticities that
are statistically signiﬁcant, negative and in line with elasticities found in other de-
veloped countries.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the responsiveness of partnered1 women’s labour
supply to the price of child care in Australia. We show that the way in which child care
prices are constructed can have very large impacts on ﬁndings, which is an important
methodological point for researchers studying the eﬀects of child care prices in any
context. We ﬁnd, in contrast with previous studies of Australia, that partnered women
decrease their labour supply in response to an increase in the price of child care. We
show that measurement error in the construction of the child care price is the main factor
which explains the diﬀerence between our ﬁndings and previous Australian studies.
Four recent studies in Australia have found that the child care price elasticity of
labour supply of partnered women is very small and generally not statistically diﬀerent
from zero. Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Kalb and Lee (2008) ﬁnd that work hours for
partnered women decrease by .02 per cent in response to a one per cent increase in
child care prices. Rammohan and Whelan (2005) ﬁnd slightly larger, but statistically
insigniﬁcant elasticities while Rammohan and Whelan (2007) ﬁnd no eﬀect of child care
price on the choice between part-time and full-time work. These results have produced
a consensus that partnered mothers’ labour supply is not responsive, on average, to the
cost of child care in Australia.
As we discuss in section 2.2 below, studies of women’s labour supply response to
changes in child care price have often had to deal with incomplete information about
hours spent in child care or costs of child care. This has led researchers to construct
approximate child care price measures which potentially suﬀer from measurement error.
In this paper, we will show the degree to which this measurement error can inﬂuence
results, focusing on the case of Australia.
The Rammohan and Whelan studies have followed Connelly (1992) in calculating
child care price as the ratio of total child care costs divided by mother’s hours worked.
This measure is then used to estimate a child care price equation from which family-
speciﬁc prices are predicted and included in a labour supply or participation model.
This measure of the child care price suﬀers from two problems.
• If the total child care costs in the data reﬂect child care used both for times during
1Throughout we use ‘partnered’ to refer to women who are either married or in a de facto relationship.
2which the mother is working and times for which the mother is not working, the
constructed price will tend to overstate the hourly child care price.2
• This price ignores the heterogeneity of child care. Full-time day care for a one-
year-old and after-school care for an eight-year-old are not the same good nor do
they have the same price.
Using newly available, more detailed data on child-speciﬁc hours spent in child care,
we are able to construct a more accurate child care price for each child. We use these
child-level prices to construct local area average prices for three diﬀerent age groups of
children: 0-2 year-olds, 3-4 year-olds, and 5-13 year-olds. Child care price for each of
these age groups is allowed to enter separately into women’s labour supply decisions.
Through this process, we eliminate the two main sources of measurement error discussed
above. Most importantly, the estimated elasticity of women’s labour supply responsive-
ness to the price of child care of -0.29 which results from using this improved price is
statistically signiﬁcant, near the mean of what has been found in other OECD countries,
and strikes us as much more economically plausible than the previous estimate of zero.
To further demonstrate that our results are driven by construction of the price
variable, we also compare our method of constructing the price with that used in the
previous studies. When we use total child care costs divided by mother’s hours worked,
we ﬁnd very small and statistically insigniﬁcant elasticity estimates.
In the rest of the paper, we present a joint model of partnered women’s labour supply
and household child care demand in section 2. We discuss modeling options in 2.1 and
methodological issues relating to price, quality, and informal care in 2.2, both in the
context of our model and the international literature. We ﬁnish with a brief discussion
of the Australian child care context. We discuss our data in section 3 and speciﬁcally
our construction of the child care price in section 3.3. We present our results in section
4 and conclude in the ﬁnal section.
2Some studies, such as Connelly (1992), use hours of child care speciﬁcally for working purposes, but
other studies and some data sets do not make this distinction.
32M o d e l
We begin by presenting a model of women’s labour supply and child care demand. In
the context of this model, we discuss the relevant literature in section 2.1, focusing on
the diﬀerent modeling assumptions which have been made in previous work. In section
2.2 we discuss four important data and methodological issues, again with reference
to this model and approaches that have been taken in the previous literature on the
eﬀect of child care prices on women’s labour supply. We ﬁnish in section 2.3 with a
discussion of child care in Australia with attention to the government subsidy system
which constitutes an important part of the model.
We model the joint household decision regarding mother’s labour supply and hours
of formal child care demanded for each child. We treat the husband’s working hours,
leisure, and time taking care of children as ﬁxed. While this is somewhat restrictive, it
still provides a good approximation of the Australian situation. Women undertake the
vast majority of at-home care of children and women’s labour supply in general is much
more responsive to the presence or absence of children in the household than men’s
labour supply.








by choosing consumption, y, mother’s leisure, lm, and parental child care by the mother,
ck
m for each child. We assume that mothers can care for more than one child at a time and
the total length of time that mothers spend on parental child care, cm,i st h u st h es a m ea s







is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between total waking hours, T, and time spent working, hm,
or taking care of children such that lm = T − hm − cm. Children need to be taken care
of during all waking hours, T∗
k. Parental child care is the diﬀerence between total hours
and non-parental child care, ck. Thus, for each child k, ck
m + ck
f = T∗
k − ck where ck
f
is time where the father is taking care of the child. Since we treat ck
f as ﬁxed, we can
normalize the model by combining the two constant terms Tk = T∗
k − ck
f so the time
constraint for child care becomes Tk = ck
m+ck. (This equation, in words, means: during
waking hours, when the child is not being cared for by the father, the child must either
4be cared for by the mother or placed in non-parental child care.)
The family is also subject to a budget constraint which is aﬀected by the tax and
welfare system and the child care subsidy system. Post-tax income (from mother’s
wages, w, and other income, y0, which includes non-labour income and father’s wage
income) must be greater than consumption plus expenditure on child care, which is
determined by the child care price, pk, which may diﬀer for each child k. This provides












where τ and ν capture the rules of the tax and transfer and child care subsidy systems.
These may depend upon family characteristics as well as upon total income and child
care expenditure. The household’s problem is to choose total consumption, mother’s
hours worked, and hours of paid child care for each child to maximize (1) subject to (2).
Labour supply and child care demand of the household will be governed by the







− ν pk = τ w, k =1 ,...,K (3)
where Us, s = y,lm,c k
m are marginal utilities with respect to its argument, ν pk is the
marginal child care costs for an additional hour of child care taking into account the
child care beneﬁt system and τ w is the marginal, after tax income for an additional
hour of work taking into account the tax and transfer system.
The optimal labour supply and child care demand for each child k can be derived








y0,w,p 1,...,p k,X,Q i

(5)
where Qi are child-speciﬁc characteristics for the i-th child. Equation (5) provides K
child care demand functions all of which depend upon all of the child care prices.
2.1 Modeling options and previous literature
If child care is ignored as an argument of the utility function, the terms
Uck
m
Uy −ν pk will
be absent and the marginal utilities in (3) and the resulting labour supply equation (4)
will be mis-speciﬁed. This approach, treating child care only as an expense to free up
5time for parents to work, might be called the ‘costs of working’ approach. Child care is
ignored as a choice variable and the price of child care is included only in X.
Several papers follow this ‘cost of working’ approach. Averett, Peters and Waldman
(1997) estimate labour supply for married mothers using the National Longitudinal
Surveys of Youth; Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (2000) conduct simulations
based upon a labour supply model estimated from data from the Family Resources
Survey (1994-1996); in Australia, Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Kalb and Lee (2008)
use data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing Costs
and data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
survey. Results from these studies vary, with Averett et al. (1997) reporting a very
large participation elasticity (-0.78) but Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Kalb and Lee
(2008) ﬁnding elasticities for both hours and participation of zero for married women
and small hours (-0.16) and participation (-0.09) elasticities for lone parents. (Blundell
et al. (2000) do not report any elasticities.)
In models which attempt to account for both factors, labour supply and child care
demand are chosen simultaneously. Most studies have taken this ‘simultaneous ap-
proach’. One option is to take the ‘direct approach’ of explicitly specifying a form for
the utility function (1), and the budget constraint (2). Estimates of the preference pa-
rameters (which determine utility) are then used to obtain the optimal labour supply
and child care demand equations (equations (4) and (5)) either by tangency rules or,
more commonly, by simulation. The advantage of this approach is that it makes policy
evaluation possible in complicated environments (where τ and ν are highly non-linear).
The disadvantage is that it relies upon untestable hypotheses about the form of the util-
ity function. In some cases, mis-speciﬁcation of the utility function may be innocuous,
whereas in others it may produce mis-leading results.
Papers which have taken this direct, simultaneous approach include Heckman (1974a),
Blau and Robins (1988), Michalopoulos, Robins and Garﬁnkel (1992), Ribar (1995) and
Blau and Hagy (1998) for the U.S.; Powell (2002) for Canada; Andren (2003) for Sweden;
Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) for Norway; and Wrohlich (2006) for Germany. These
studies ﬁnd participation elasticities ranging from 0 for single mothers in Sweden to -0.38
for married women in the U.S. (Blau and Robins (1988)). The average participation
6elasticity is around -0.14 across the seven studies which report a participation elastic-
ity. Only Andren (2003), Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) and Wrohlich (2006) report
hours elasticities and these are higher than the participation elasticities. Participation
elasticities for these three studies average -0.06 whereas the hours elasticities average
-0.16.
The ‘indirect approach’ uses equations (4) and (5) as the starting point and speciﬁes
reduced forms for these equations which are then estimated. The main advantage of
this approach is that it addresses the problem in a simple and straightforward way. The
main drawback of this approach is that estimates are only valid in relatively simple
tax and welfare systems or if the sample is homogeneous in terms of tax rates and
welfare system rules which households face. Because it ignores the complexity of the tax
and welfare systems, it is impossible to recover net price elasticities directly from these
models without further information or assumptions regarding the relationship between
net and gross price elasticities.
Table 1
Summary of elasticity estimates from literature






















































Table reproduced from Gong, Breunig and King (2010)
Papers which have adopted the ‘indirect’ approach include Connelly (1992), Ribar
(1992), Kimmel (1998), Anderson and Levine (1999) for the U.S.; Powell (1997) for
Canada; and (Rammohan and Whelan, 2005, 2007) for Australia. Participation and
hours elasticities from the non-Australian studies average -0.34. The two Australian
7studies ﬁnd zero participation elasticities and small and insigniﬁcant hours elasticities.
In addition to varying in methodological approach, sample restrictions vary widely
across the studies, some studies use married women, others single women, and others
a mix of the two. In general, with the exception of the Australian studies, there does
seem to be evidence of signiﬁcant, negative eﬀects of child care price on female labour
supply. In a working paper, we undertook a comprehensive review of recent studies.
We reproduce Table 1 from that working paper here. Blau and Currie (2006) have also
recently reviewed the international literature.
2.2 Data and methodological issues
The two data issues mentioned earlier–the absence of hourly child care price data and
the heterogeneity of child care–and dealing with unobservable child care quality and
the presence of informal (usually unpaid) child care constitute important challenges
for the applied researcher. We discuss these general data and methodological issues and
conclude this sub-section with a discussion of some additional, speciﬁc issues which arise
in the Australian literature.
There is a general lack of information about child care prices and usage in survey
data. Lack of proper child care information forces researchers to construct various
measures of price. Without observing any child care price directly, Heckman (1974b)
normalises the price of formal child care to 1 and ‘estimates’ the price of informal child
care (relative to formal care) using demographic variables and an interesting array of
identifying assumptions. Connelly (1992) only has child care costs for households where
the mother is working and no information on child care hours. She constructs the ‘child
care price’ by dividing child care costs by hours worked of the mother. This approach is
followed by several studies including (Rammohan and Whelan, 2005, 2007) for Australia.
However, this measure cannot be reasonably construed as the ‘child care price’ because
it varies with hours worked even if the true child care price is constant. Powell (1997)
only has access to data about work-related child care and constructs a price similarly.
With the exception of Blau and Hagy (1998), Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Kalb and
Lee (2008) (which use external data sources for prices) all of the studies mentioned in
section 2.1 have to predict the ‘price’ for non child care users using information from
8the users of child care.
A second issue is that in most studies households are assumed to face a single ‘price’
for all types of child care for children of all ages. In many studies this price is con-
structed by dividing total child care costs by total child care hours, aggregating over
children from very diﬀerent age groups. The implied assumption is that child care for
diﬀerent children in the household is a homogeneous good and can be represented using
a single price. If true prices are diﬀerent for each child, each price should have its own
eﬀect on the mother’s labour supply. It is also important to note that the ‘price’ con-
structed as the average hourly cost in the household is diﬀerent from the average hourly
price. It is the latter which should enter into the households’ decision-making process.
Treating the average hourly cost as a ‘price’ is erroneous and causes biased estimates
when households have more than one child. The consequences may be less pronounced
for more homogenous samples–for example considering a sub-sample of only pre-school
children, as in Blau and Hagy (1998).
A third issue, and undoubtedly an important one from the families’ point of view, is
that of the heterogeneous quality of child care. Arguably, the household chooses not only
hours of child care but also quality of child care. Since child care quality is unobserved,
but correlated with price, an omitted variable problem is created which may lead to
biased estimators. Taking quality into account, and having adequate data on quality,
are demanding tasks and Blau and Robins (1988) and Blau and Hagy (1998) are the
only studies to model it to a satisfactory degree.3 They use a ‘quality-adjusted’ price at
the local market level predicted from additional data on child care providers.
Fourthly, an important feature of the child care market is the existence of informal
child care which provides an (imperfect) substitute for formal care. Although the focus
in most studies is on formal child care, the treatment of informal child care in modelling
may also be expected to impact the results. In some studies such as Connelly (1992)
informal care is ignored, while in other studies it is modeled explicitly, such as Heckman
(1974b), and Blau and Robins (1988) and Blau and Hagy (1998).
The Australian studies suﬀer from additional data and modeling limitations. (Ram-
3Mocan (2007) shows that although consumers attach high importance to child care quality, they often
fail to get the right perception of child care quality because of information asymmetry. In particular,
child care providers are informed about the level of quality of their services, but the parents have
diﬃculty in distinguishing between the quality levels of alternative centers.
9mohan and Whelan, 2005, 2007) use a sample of 1138 married women where only about
190 paid for child care. In addition, the child care costs used in the analysis are the costs
‘net’ of government subsidies, which are partly determined by the labour supply of the
parents. Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Kalb and Lee (2008) use average state-level prices
(from the administrative Child Care Census data described in section 3.3 below) which
fail to capture the bulk of price variation which is within-state, not across state. Hence
it is not surprising that the estimates they report have very low precision. Another issue
in these two studies is that child care usage is ﬁrst predicted conditional on observed
labour supply. Household labour supply is then simulated from a model where house-
holds maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint from which these predicted
child care costs are subtracted.
2.3 The Australian context
In our paper, we focus on modeling demand for formal child care. Formal child care
consists of three types of care: Long Day Care centres; Family Day Care; and In-Home
Care. ‘Long Day Care’ refers to centre-based care and preschool programs primarily for
not-yet-in-school-aged children (with the exception of school holiday programs). Long
Day Care centres have relatively skilled staﬀ and those that provide preschool programs
have at least one trained teacher on staﬀ. About two-thirds of Long Day Care centres
are run by private operators while the remaining centres are run by local government or
community organizations. About one-third of not-yet-in-school-aged Australian children
in care are in long day care centres.4
Fifteen percent of not-yet-in-school-aged children are in some form of formal home-
based care. ‘In-Home Care’ involves registered carers who come to the child’s own home
whereas ‘Family Day Care’ refers to registered carers who take care of several children
in their own home. Home-based carers often have a mix of pre-school and before- and
after-school care for school-aged children. Many public and private schools also oﬀer
before- and after-school care which also qualiﬁes for the subsidies described below.
Just over one-third of children are in informal care which consists of relatives or
unregulated caregivers. Some informal care is paid for directly, while other forms of
informal care may not be paid for or may carry non-pecuniary costs. The oﬃcial data
4See Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2008).
10give us little insight into this part of the child care market. We do not model demand for
informal care, but include variables in the model for formal child care which are related
to the presence or absence of informal care options.
Both home-based care and long day care centres are inspected and accredited by the
Australian government. Accreditation allows parents access to the government subsidy
program for child care and very few centres are not accredited. The primary subsidy
is Child Care Beneﬁt (CCB), a means-tested program which reduces the hourly cost
of child care. Beneﬁts are paid either to families or directly to the child care provider.
The current maximum subsidy is $3.68 per hour and this decreases with family income.
CCB is not paid to families with one child in care who make over $134,443 per annum.
This cut-oﬀ is slightly higher for families with more children. (See Centrelink (2010).)
Child Care Rebate (CCR), which is not means-tested, is a tax rebate which can be
claimed by families with children in accredited care. The maximum claimable tax rebate
is $7,500 per child per year. CCR is a relatively new program which was announced at
the beginning of our sample period (see discussion in section 3 below).
Child-care providers can set their own fees. Entry into the child care provision
market is free and open as evidenced by the rapid growth of privately-provided child
care places in the last 10 years, thus lack of availability is probably not as severe as in
Europe. For example, Wrohlich (2006) states that in 2002, there were only 3 slots in child
care centers for every 100 children under three in former West Germany. In Australia,
although availability of child care makes headlines, about one third of children under
three use center-based care and if children using family day care (where children are in
care at a licensed carer’s home, excluding relatives) are included, about half of children
under three are in formal child care (based upon the authors’ calculation using our data
and the government child care census).5
3D a t a
Data used for the main analysis are drawn from waves ﬁve, six, and seven of the ‘in-
conﬁdence’ version of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey
(HILDA) which cover the period 2005 - 2007. The HILDA Survey is an annual panel
5Breunig, Gong, Mercante, Weiss and Yamauchi (2011) examine the relationship between local prob-
lems with reported child care availability and women’s labour supply.
11survey of Australian households which was begun in 2001.6 There are approximately
7,000 households and 13,000 individuals who respond in each wave. The choice of data is
based upon the following three considerations. First, and most importantly, the HILDA
data from wave ﬁve onwards collected child care usage data separately by child and
separately for employment and non-employment related reasons. In the ﬁrst four waves,
data was more aggregated within the household. Secondly, we choose to pool across
three waves of data to achieve a suﬃciently large sample size. This is important in the
construction of our local average child care price. We use median child care prices within
Labour Force Survey Regions (LFSR) as deﬁned by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS).7 In order to construct this local average price we need a reasonable number of
observations in each LFSR. Pooling across these three waves achieves suﬃcient sample
size to estimate a median for each LFSR. Lastly, child care policies in Australia were
roughly constant over this period. In particular, there were no major changes to the
Child Care Beneﬁt scheme during this period. The Child Care Tax Rebate (CCTR),
now called Child Care Rebate, was announced at the beginning of the sample period.
However, the way in which the rebate was originally structured through the tax system
meant that families did not receive the rebate, in the form of a lump sum payment, until
two years after making the expense. Given this time lag and the lump-sum nature of
the payment, we assume that this program did not aﬀect people’s decisions during our
sample period. This assumption seems conﬁrmed in the data–see footnote 13. A ﬁnal
consideration which favours this choice of sample period is that the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) created a child care price index, which we use to make the price
comparable across waves. This index is only available from 2005.8
We focus on the labour supply of partnered mothers and demand for formal child
care of children under age 13. We eliminate mothers who are retired or who are full-time
students. After discarding observations with missing values for any variables used in our
model, we are left with a sample of 4,184 mothers and their 7,682 children across the
6See Watson and Wooden (2002) for more details.
7Labour Force Survey Regions are described in Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005).
8A net child care price index has been available since the 1980s. The gross child care price index
required here has only been available since 2005. See “Child Care Time Series Table” in “Appendix
Child Care Services in the CPI. Treatment of Child Care Services in the Australian Consumer Price
Index (CPI)” in Australian Bureau of Statistics (2010).
12three waves from 2005 to 2007.9
For validation of our results and for comparison with earlier Australian studies, we
also use data from waves two, three and four (2002 through 2004) of the ‘in-conﬁdence’
version of HILDA. Child care data for this period are less detailed; in particular non-
employment related child care usage is aggregated within each household for two age
groups: not-yet-in-school and school-aged children. For the wave two through four data,
we thus only select households with at most one child in each age group. This allows
us to match employment and non-employment related child care usages and costs to
particular children for comparability with the main sample from waves ﬁve to seven.
This results in a smaller sample of 2,111 mothers and 2,661 children.
Another issue with the data from 2002 to 2004 is that, since the ABS Gross Child
Care Price Index is not available for this period, we use the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
as the child care price deﬂator. This is likely to contribute to measurement error in the
child care price variable in the pooled data. The child care policy environment is also a
little diﬀerent in this earlier period compared with the later period. The most important
diﬀerence is that the Child Care Tax Rebate had not yet been announced in this period.
These data issues need to be kept in mind when comparing the results from the two
samples. We return to these points in our discussion.
3.1 Labour supply, wage and non-labour income
In this section, we discuss the key variables used in the analysis such as labour supply,
wages, and child care usage and costs. A number of demographic variables describing
family’s and children’s characteristics are included in the model; we also include variables
such as immigration status and the presence of additional female adults in the household
to proxy the availability and the shadow price of informal child care. Sample statistics
for the mothers and the children are presented in Table 2.
Average weekly hours worked by the partnered mothers in our sample is 18 hours.
About 67 per cent of the 4,184 mothers worked at the time of interview. The average
hourly wage was $22.5 for the mothers and $25.9 for the fathers (in June 2005 terms).
9Exact details of the sample selection procedure are available from the authors.
13Table 2
Descriptive statistics: Analysis sample from HILDA
Waves 5 through 7 pooled
Variable Mothers Children
Hours worked per week 18.2
(17.0)
Hours spent in child care
(if in child care)
15.5
(12.2)
Proportion in child care 0.23
Hourly wage rate (at June 2005 prices) 22.5
(26.0)
Hourly median child care price







Indicator, mother has higher education 0.28
Indicator, mother has vocational education 0.25
Indicator, mother ﬁnished Year 12 only 0.20
Indicator, mother did not ﬁnish Year 12 0.27
Indicator, father has higher education 0.23
Indicator, father has vocational education 0.41
Indicator, father ﬁnished Year 12 only 0.17
Indicator, father did not ﬁnish Year 12 0.19
Indicator, has younger sibling
present in household
0.43




Indicator, in school 0.60
Number of children aged 0-5 0.83
(0.8)
Number of children aged 6-12 0.98
(0.9)
Number of children aged 13-15 0.25
(0.5)
Age of youngest child 4.83
(3.9)
Indicator, other female adult in household 0.08
Indicator, mother or partner foreign born
(but not both)
0.23
Indicator, mother and partner foreign born 0.12
State of residence indicator variables
New South Wales (NSW) 0.29
Victoria (VIC) 0.25
Queensland (QLD) 0.21
South Australia (SA) 0.08
Western Australia (WA) 0.09
Tasmania (TAS) 0.03
Northern Territory (NT) 0.01
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 0.02
Sample size 4,184 7,862
Notes: Means with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors suppressed for indicator variables.
14The wages of non-working parents are not observed and for some working parents they
are missing. For these individuals, we predict wages using a standard Mincer wage
equation and the Heckman (1979) procedure. The explanatory variables include age and
its square, a set of education dummy variables, country of birth and family characteristics
at the age of 14. Estimates of the wage equations correspond to typical estimates from
the Australian literature (see for example Breunig, Cobb-Clark and Gong (2008)) and
are available from the authors upon request.
Mothers’ labour supply decisions and preferences for child care can be expected to
depend upon the income of the father and unearned household income. As described in
section 2, we only look at the mother’s work decision and treat father’s labour supply
and earnings as ﬁxed. The average of combined non labour income and fathers’ earnings
is $1,042 per week for the 2005 - 2007 sample (in June 2005 terms).
3.2 Child care usage
Of the 7,682 children in the 2005 - 2007 sample, 4,640 were school-aged children (between
the ages of ﬁve and twelve years) and 3,042 children were not yet in school (less than
ﬁve years of age) at the time of the survey. A summary of formal child care usage by
these children is given in Table 3.10
Table 3
Formal child care usage in couple households from HILDA (2005-2007)
Age group Children using formal care in each Children in Number
hour category per week (%) formal care Average
Hours per
week:





22.0 37.2 21.4 9.5 9.8 38.8 19.7
(12.3) 3,042
School-aged 75.3 20.8 3.3 0.5 0.0 12.4 6.9
(5.7) 4,640
All 39.5 31.9 15.5 6.6 6.6 22.9 15.5
(12.2) 7,682
Average hours are only for those who attend. Standard deviations in parentheses.
As would be expected, children not yet in school use much more formal child care than
school-aged children. About 40 per cent of not-yet-in-school children used formal care
and the average hours attended by those using formal care was approximately 20 hours
per week. This is a little bit more than the 18 average hours worked by the mothers in
10For school-aged children, only care during non-vacation periods is considered.
15the sample. Only about 12 per cent of school-aged children used formal child care and,
on average, these users spent about seven hours per week in care. Together with thirty
hours at school, this is approximately the hours of a full-time worker.
To get an idea of how the child care information from the HILDA survey compares
to administrative data, Table 4 presents information on child care usage from the 2006
Child Care Census (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations
(2008)). Because the Child Care Census data does not distinguish between partnered
couples and single parent families, the comparable HILDA data are for these two groups
combined (not just for partnered couples).11
Table 4
Formal child care usage in all households with children
HILDA (2005-2007) compared to 2006 Child Care Census
Age group Children using formal care in each Children in Number
hour category per week (%) formal care Average
Hours per
week:




HILDA 21.0 36.6 21.0 10.8 10.6 39.6 20.2
(12.1) 3,538
Census 25.7 33.4 20.9 10.3 9.6 - - -
School-aged
HILDA 72.1 23.1 4.1 0.7 0.0 12.9 7.2
(5.7) 5,841
Census 56.5 35.5 3.9 2.0 2.1 - - -
All
HILDA 38.9 31.9 15.1 7.3 6.8 23.0 15.6
(12.4) 9,379
Census 35.1 34.0 15.7 7.8 6.3 - 15.5 -
Average hours are only for those who attend. Standard deviations in parentheses.
The pattern for not-yet-in-school children matches the Child Care Census data better
than that for school-aged children, with the Child Care Census data showing fewer
school-aged children using lower hours of care than in the HILDA data. This may
be due to our weighting assumption described in footnote 11, which may somewhat
11In order to construct this table, we have to manipulate the child care census data as the government
does not provide a breakdown of hours of child care by age. The data is provided by type of care (long
day care; family day care; before- and after-school care) and the census provides a summary of hours
attended by all children and a proportion of children that are school-aged in each type of care. Using
this proportion, children in each type of care were weighted into the school-aged and not-yet-in-school
groups, under the working assumption that the number of hours in care is independent of age. This
assumption is only employed in constructing Table 4 and does not aﬀect any of our results reported
elsewhere.
16overestimate the usage by school-aged children. Overall, the data we use seem fairly
close to the administrative data.
3.3 Child care prices
One key aspect of this paper is the construction of the hourly child care price. In the
HILDA survey, we have the number of hours (hkht) spent in child care for each child (k)
in the household (h) for each type of child care (t)–long day care, family day care, and
other formal paid care.12 Net cost of child care (	 csht) is not provided for each child but
is provided for each type of care and is split by school-aged (s = 1) and not-yet-in-school
(s = 0) aged children. For example, for families who have one child in the not-yet-in-
school-aged category, we know the cost of child care for each type of care for that child.
For families that have more than one child in the not-yet-in-school-aged category, we
only know the total amount spent on that group of children for each type of care.
Since we know the hours that each child is in care for each type of care, we split the
cost in proportion to the hours spent in that type of care. We assume that families are
spending the same amount per hour on each child within the same age range for each
type of care. We calculate the net child care cost per child as







In the HILDA survey, only child care costs net of ‘regular child care beneﬁts’ is
available. However, with the information we have on child care usage by each child,
gross family income, child and family characteristics, and Child Care Beneﬁt (CCB)
eligibility rules, we are able to construct the gross cost of child care for each child for
each type of care, (ckht).13
12This last category is mostly in-home care as described in section 2.3. Households in the data report
hours of child care used. We calculate hours paid by rounding up to multiples of ﬁve hours for not-yet-
in-school-aged children and multiples of three hours for school-aged children to reﬂect typical lengths of
paid sessions. Long day care centres and family day care centres typically operate 50 hours per week,
and typical part-time arrangements are at least in units of half-days. For school-aged children, typical
after-school care sessions are 3 hours.
13These gross costs ignore the Child Care Tax Rebate (CCTR) which was only paid in the latter part
of our sample period. Furthermore, when CCTR ﬁrst came out, it was paid twelve to eighteen months
after the original child care expenditure was made, so we think it unlikely that families would have
deducted this yet-to-be-reimbursed amount from the reported cost of child care. Finally, if we calculate
the prices as if the household were reporting costs after accounting for CCTR, we ﬁnd child care prices
that are widely out of line with the administrative data reported in Table 5.





We take all of these individual child prices and calculate three median prices for each
Labour Force Survey Region (LFSR): one for 0-2 year-olds, one for 3-4 year-olds, and
one for school-aged children. Figure A3 in the appendix shows the number of observed
prices for each LFSR in our data. We impute this median price to each household in the
LFSR rather than use a child care price equation as some studies have done. For school-
aged children, we have, on average, fourteen observations per LFSR. For 3-4 year-olds,
we have eleven observations per LFSR on average and for 0-2 year-olds we have ten
observations per LFSR on average. There is substantial variation across LFSRs.
Table 5
Comparison of hourly gross child care prices as constructed from HILDA (2005-2007)
and from 2006 Child Care Census







Median Mean Mean Median Mean Mean
NSW 4.31 4.54 4.56 5.10 5.40 4.16
VIC 4.44 4.55 4.39 4.00 4.78 3.40
QLD 4.31 4.43 3.98 4.59 5.51 3.52
SA 4.17 4.19 4.14 4.48 5.12 3.52
WA 4.15 4.28 4.14 5.55 5.66 4.57
TAS 4.86 4.86 4.18 5.39 5.80 4.77
NT 5.00 4.59 4.04 4.87 4.88 5.36
ACT 5.72 5.16 4.88 5.41 6.78 4.93
All 4.33 4.49 4.31 4.62 5.26 3.68
Child care census hourly prices for not-yet-in-school children are the averages of long day care centres
and family day care weighted by the number of children in each type of care.
Child care census hourly prices for school-aged children are the averages of the before- and after-school
care per session fee divided by their typical session lengths (3 hours for after-school care and 1.5 or 2
hours for before-school care.)
The prices we use are constructed from the survey data as described above. Price
data is available through the Child Care Census data for 2006 (mid-way through our
sample period) but only at the state level. Table 5 compares gross prices constructed
from the HILDA survey data with this administrative data. It appears that our method
of constructing prices and incorporating the child care subsidy system match the admin-
istrative data, at least on average, fairly well. It is surprising that prices for school-aged
18children in the data are higher than for not-yet-in-school children when the administra-
tive data show the opposite. Failure to match the means in the child care census should
not have any eﬀect on the estimated elasticities (although it could aﬀect the estimated
constant) provided that the variation across LFSRs matches the variation in the true
underlying data. Without access to detailed administrative data, we can not check this
assumption.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Empirical speciﬁcation and estimation
We use the ‘indirect approach’ of specifying the labour supply and child care demand
equations which arise from the utility maximization problem. This choice is motivated by
simplicity and comparability with (Rammohan and Whelan, 2005, 2007). The empirical
counterparts to equations (4) and (5) which we estimate are




+ Xhβ + uh
(8)




+ Xcα + uc (9)
where the ηsa n dθs are scalar parameters to be estimated. α and β are vectors of param-
eters to be estimated (both of which include constant terms). Control variables included
in Xh and Xc are things that shift preferences for leisure and child care demand. We
include variables such as the presence of other female adults in the household, migration
status of parents, and presence of older siblings in the family which might aﬀect the
availability and shadow cost of informal child care. We include the age distribution of
all children in the family, which is an important determinant of female time allocation
preferences. We do not model informal child care and its price explicitly due to the fact
that much informal child care is non-paid.
For the child care price variables, ln(pi), we use the median price within the local
labour force statistical region where the household resides for 0-2 year-olds, 3-4 year-
olds, and school-aged children. The median price is calculated from the survey data as
described in section 3.3 above.
19Using a local average price is important to overcome endogeneity issues associated
with using a household-level price measure. Households simultaneously choose work
hours, amount of child care, and the quality of child care. Chosen hours of work and
childcare may depend upon quality, which we don’t observe, but which will be correlated
with price. This creates on omitted variable problem since omitted quality is correlated
with included price. By using local area averages, we are essentially using a quality-
adjusted price. Our modeling assumption is that households react to the average price
level irrespective of the quality they choose. This is akin to assuming that shifts in
median prices aﬀect all quality levels. Finally, we also control for child care quality
by adding variables from the administrative data which capture the average number of
qualiﬁed staﬀ per child in formal day care centres. These variables are only available at
the state level however.
We make several assumptions which make estimation simpler. Firstly, we restrict
the eﬀects of child care prices in the labour supply equation to be the same for all types
of childcare (ηp0 = ηp3 = ηp5). In the child care demand equations, we restrict the cross-
price eﬀects (for child care prices other than the one that applies to that particular child)
to be zero. We also restrict the eﬀect of other explanatory variables in those equations
to be the same for each child. This assumption, that parameters for each child are
identical, allows us to pool the child care demand equations together. Thus, in practice,
we only estimate one child care demand equation with the restriction θp0 = θp3 = θp5.
This approach allows for the heterogeneity of child care prices for diﬀerent types of
care, but restricts the eﬀect of price changes on child care demand to be equal. The
resulting single parameter can be viewed as an average eﬀect of child care price changes.
Separate estimation of three diﬀerent child care equations (one for 0-2 year-olds, one for
3-4 year-olds, and one for school-aged children) provides very similar parameters but
larger standard errors due to the fairly small sample sizes for each age group. We only
report the results for the restricted model with one child care equation.
Equations (8) and (9) are speciﬁed as tobit models to account for the substantial
number of observations with either zero hours worked or zero hours of formal child care
or both. We estimate them separately by maximum likelihood.14 We obtain standard
14Asymptotically, joint estimation should only aﬀect eﬃciency, not consistency.
20errors by clustered bootstrapping which takes into account the correlations between
observations in the same household.
4.2 Results
Our key ﬁnding is that labour supply elasticities with respect to child care price for
both hours worked and participation are negative, statistically signiﬁcant, and similar
to the international averages presented in Table 1. Table 6 summarizes our estimated
elasticities for an average partnered mother with one child under age 13.15 For a typical
partnered mother, for every one per cent increase in the average child care price, her rate
of employment would decrease by 0.29 per cent, and her hours worked would decrease
by 0.65 per cent (from column 3 of Table 6). The 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals are
(−0.12,−0.44) for the employment elasticity and (−0.32,−0.98) for the hours worked
elasticity.
Parameter estimates of the labour supply (8) and child care demand (9) equations
for the 2005 - 2007 sample are presented in Tables A1 and A2 of the appendix. Because
we are pooling across three waves of a panel data set, we have multiple observations
on some women. To account for this, we use the clustered bootstrap in our estimation
of the standard errors. Model I suppresses the interaction terms between child care
price and non-labour income (we set ηpI = θpI = 0 in equations (8) and (9)) whereas
Model II includes these terms which allow diﬀerent child care price eﬀects across income
groups. We prefer Model II as the interaction terms between child care price and other
private income are jointly signiﬁcant, indicating that the eﬀects of child care price and
other private income on labour supply and child care demand are diﬀerent for diﬀerent
income groups. Other private income is signiﬁcantly negative in the child care demand
equation, but is statistically insigniﬁcant in the labour supply equation. Other variables
have the expected sign and signiﬁcance–see the appendix.
We also estimate a model where we interact the number of children in the household
with the child care price in the labour supply equation. The results are not substantially
diﬀerent than what is reported here. We also estimated the model using only the obser-
vations in LFSRs where we have 15 or more observed child care prices in the LFSR. The
15We calculate the elasticity at the sample mean of the participation propensity (for the employment
elasticity) and the sample mean of hours worked (for the hours elasticity).
21point estimates for the hours and employment elasticities are both statistically signiﬁ-
cant and not much diﬀerent from what is reported above: -0.73 (instead of -0.65) and
-0.33 (instead of -0.29). These additional results are available from the authors upon
request.
Table 6
Estimated child care price elasticities from HILDA (2005-2007)
Labour supply elasticities Child care demand elasticities
With respect to Model I Model II Model I Model II



































Labour supply and child care demand elasticities are calculated at average hours worked (18) and of
child care usage (15.6). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level
∗ signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level
The other elasticity estimates are all in plausible ranges. Demand for child care is
downward sloping, as expected. The labour supply elasticity with respect to wage is
about 0.35 which is close to what other Australian studies ﬁnd.16 The wage elasticity
of child care is positive. If mother’s wage increases by one per cent, the family would
increase demand for child care for each child by 0.23 per cent. As expected, mother’s
labour supply and child care demand are strong complements.
Child care price elasticities vary across income groups. Figures A1 and A2 in the
appendix show how child care price elasticities of employment and child care demand
vary across other income. The child care price elasticity of child care demand is slightly
decreasing in income but the elasticity of child care price with respect to labour supply
increases slightly with income. This may suggest that, compared to lower income fam-
ilies, in higher income families the mothers’ labour supply is more responsive to child
care price changes but the demand for child care is less responsive. One interpretation
is that, when the child care price changes, females in low income families are more likely
to adjust their formal child care demand than their labour supply. Given the wide
conﬁdence intervals, we would be cautious about pushing these conjectures too far.
16See Breunig and Mercante (2010), for example.
224.3 Role of child care price in explaining previous Australian studies
The previous Australian studies of (Rammohan and Whelan, 2005, 2007) used earlier
data from the same survey which we use (HILDA) and followed Connelly (1992) in
constructing child care price as the total cost of child care (potentially across multiple
children of very diﬀerent ages in the household) divided by total hours worked by the
mother. This measure of child care price has several problems. The ﬁrst is that it
implicitly assumes that the price of child care per hour is the same for children of all
ages. In the Australian context, this is certainly not true, with prices for the 0-2 year-
olds higher than for the 3-4 year-olds because of the requirement of higher staﬀ-child
ratios for the former group. The second problem with this construction is that it assumes
that the costs of child care are spread across all hours of work. Thus there is no role for
informal care nor for child care usage outside of working hours.
In this paper, we have exploited new data (available only from 2005 onwards in
HILDA) which allows calculation of per-child expenditure and provides detailed infor-
mation on the usage of child care which allows us to calculate prices for each speciﬁc age
group and to attribute child care costs directly to hours of child care used rather than to
hours worked. In order to explore the importance of this improved construction of child
care prices and in order to understand whether it drives the diﬀerences between our
study and the previous literature, we undertake two comparisons. The ﬁrst comparison
is to redo our analysis presented above keeping everything the same but replacing our
price measure with a price calculated as (Rammohan and Whelan, 2005, 2007) have:
total cost of child care divided by total hours worked by the mother. These results are
presented in the second and third columns of the top panel of Table 7.
The diﬀerence is dramatic. When we calculate price as total cost of child care
divided by total hours worked by the mother we ﬁnd a very small, positive elasticity
which is statistically indistinguishable from zero. A plausible explanation is that the
measurement error created by constructing the childcare price in this way causes severe
attenuation in the estimated coeﬃcient.
The fourth column of the top panel of Table 7 uses the cost of child care as con-
structed in (Rammohan and Whelan, 2005, 2007) but estimates a probit model for
participation (as is done in those two papers) rather than a tobit model of hours. The
23elasticity of -0.009 is similar to what the previous Australian studies found so the dif-
ference between our results and their results does not seem to be driven by our later
sample period.17
Table 7
Estimated participation (employment) elasticities with respect to child care price
using alternative price measures, estimation methods and time periods
Partnered women with children
Approach to construction of child care price variable
Our approach Connelly approach





















Labour supply and child care demand elasticities are calculated at average hours worked (18) and of
child care usage (15.6). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level
∗ signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level
Our second comparison looks at the earlier time period 2002-2004. For this time
period, we do not have detailed per-child information on child care. However, we do
know total amounts of child care used and for which purpose (work or non-work) split
by school-aged and under school-aged children. So, for families with at most one child
under school age and at most one school-aged child, we can construct the price using
our preferred method. This subset of households, which we call the ‘restricted sample’
is about half the size of the full sample.
We select this restricted sample for both the 2002 - 2004 and 2005 - 2007 time pe-
riods and we construct child care prices using our preferred method and the method of
the previous studies. The resulting employment elasticities with respect to child care
price are reported in the second panel of Table 7. Again, our approach of constructing
the price, which eliminates substantial measurement error, produces a negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant elasticity whereas the total cost divided by hours worked approach
of constructing the price produces a statistically insigniﬁcant elasticity.
We can not rule out from this examination of the data that the participation (em-
ployment) elasticity with respect to child care price has gotten larger over time. The
17If we use our preferred price measure in the probit model, we ﬁnd an even larger and statistically
signiﬁcant participation elasticity of -0.47.
24elasticities reported here are gross price elasticities which means that they are condi-
tional on the policy setting and policy has changed over the 2002 to 2007 period. But
we can conﬁdently conclude that even in the earlier period, women’s labour supply re-
sponded to the price of child care in a negative and statistically signiﬁcant way. We
emphasize that the only diﬀerence between columns 2 and 3 in Table 7 are the way in
which the child care price is calculated.18
In summary, neither diﬀerent time periods not slightly diﬀerent estimated models
(tobit as compared to probit) seem to explain the diﬀerence between our results and
the previous Australian studies. The diﬀerence seems to be primarily due to the way in
which the price variable is constructed.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we attempt to answer the question of whether the labour supply of Aus-
tralian women is truly unresponsive to child care cost as found in previous studies. Using
newly available data, we construct a child care price which takes into account the actual
hours spent in child care and price heterogeneity for child care for diﬀerent age ranges. In
contrast with previous studies, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant, negative price elasticity
of child care with respect to partnered women’s labour force participation.
Our preferred estimated elasticity of employment with respect to the gross child care
price for an average partnered mother with young children is -0.29, and the corresponding
elasticity of hours worked is -0.65. These results correspond to our intuition that child
care price must matter for a woman’s decision of whether or not to work and of how
much to work. The estimated elasticity of employment is in the middle of the range of
those found in the international literature, while the elasticity of hours worked is at the
high end of the range of international estimates.
The actual magnitudes of these elasticities are less important than the key ﬁnding of
a statistically signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect of the price of child care on women’s labour
force participation. It can be expected that the magnitude of the elasticities will vary
with time period considered, sample, and econometric technique. Here we have used a
18The tobit model parameter estimates of equations (8) and (9) for the various combinations of child
care price/sub-sample are quite similar to those provided in Appendix Table A1 and A2. They are
available from the authors upon request.
25reduced form model. In work that is not yet published, we estimate a structural model
using a more restricted sample–see Gong and Breunig (2011). We ﬁnd eﬀects that are
about two-thirds the size of those found here, but importantly, we still ﬁnd statistically
signiﬁcant elasticities of women’s labour supply and child care demand with respect to
the price of child care.
We compare our construction of the child care price with the method used in two
previous Australian studies for our more recent sample period and on a restricted sample
for the time period covered by the earlier studies. In both cases, we ﬁnd large diﬀerences
in estimated elasticities. We conclude that using a child care price which is based
upon total cost of child care divided by total hours worked by the mother introduces
measurement error into the child care price. This measurement error in price appears
to be the reason why the studies by Rammohan and Whelan (2005) and Rammohan
and Whelan (2007) found that women’s labour supply in Australia is non-responsive to
changes in child care price. These results suggest that measurement error in the child
care price and diﬀerences in how child care prices are constructed may be one factor in
explaining variation across the international literature.
Our results challenge the consensus in Australia that women’s labour supply is un-
responsive to the price of child care. Australian policy makers have recently introduced
reforms intended to improve child care quality which could substantially increase the
price of child care. Unemployment rates in Australia remain at historical lows (just over
ﬁve per cent) and encouraging women’s labour force participation is a commonly cited
policy objective. Our study would suggest that simultaneously achieving increased par-
ticipation and increased child care quality may require additional government subsidy
of child care prices.
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28Table A1
Tobit estimates of the labour supply equation
Main sample 2005-2007 from HILDA
Variable Model I Model II
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State and year dummies included? Yes Yes
Likelihood value -13849.2 -13847.2
Observations 4,184
a The child care price variable is the average of the three local median prices (one for each age group:
0-2, 3-4, and school-aged) as described in section 3.3
Standard errors are calculated via the clustered bootstrap with 200 replications.
|t|−values in square brackets; standard errors in parentheses
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level,
∗ signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level
In model 2, the coeﬃcients on average median ln(child care price) and its interaction with ln(other
household income) are jointly signiﬁcant with a χ
2
2 value of 20.12.
In model 2, the coeﬃcients on ln(other household income) and its interaction with average median
ln(child care price) are jointly insigniﬁcant with a χ
2
2 value of 2.92.
29Table A2
Tobit estimates of the child care demand equation
Main sample 2005-2007 from HILDA
Variable Model I Model II














Average median ln(child care price)





















































































































State and year dummies included? Yes Yes
Likelihood value -9893.4 -9889.7
Observations 7,682
Notes to Table A2 on next page.
30Notes to Table A2
a The child care price variable is the average of the three local median prices (one for each age group:
0-2, 3-4, and school-aged) as described in section 3.3
Standard errors are calculated via the clustered bootstrap with 200 replications.
|t|−values in square brackets; standard errors in parentheses
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level,
∗ signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level
In model 2, the coeﬃcients on average median ln(child care price) and its interaction with ln(other
household income) are jointly signiﬁcant with a χ
2
2 value of 45.82.
In model 2, the coeﬃcients on ln(other household income) and its interaction with average median
ln(child care price) are jointly insigniﬁcant with a χ
2
2 value of 8.68.
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